D.C. Circuit Finds FERC Erred in Declining to Consider Section 206 Relief in 2024/25 PJM Capacity Auction Re-Run Case
On January 13, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision in Maryland Office of People鈥檚 Counsel, et al. v. FERC, No. 24-1353, holding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission erred in concluding that an earlier federal appellate court decision precluded it from granting relief under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) to customers who faced unusually high electricity capacity prices following a PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) capacity auction re-run. In so deciding, the court reasoned that providing such Section 206 relief was an exception to the general rule under the 鈥渇iled-rate doctrine鈥 that prohibits retroactive modification of filed rates. The court vacated FERC鈥檚 orders on appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. In doing so, the decision clarifies the distinct roles of Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA and underscores the limits of the filed-rate doctrine in constraining FERC鈥檚 remedial authority.
No party requested rehearing of the decision, so the court issued its mandate on March 10, 2026. Unless one of the parties seeks and receives Supreme Court review,[1] the case now returns to FERC, which must consider on the merits whether the re-run auction results are unjust and unreasonable under Section 206 and, if so, what relief is appropriate.
Background
PJM is the Regional Transmission Organization that manages electricity transmission and markets across all or parts of thirteen Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states and the District of Columbia, covering more than 67 million customers. It is the nation鈥檚 largest organized wholesale electricity market. PJM procures power generation capacity鈥攖he ability to produce electricity when necessary鈥攂y conducting auctions years in advance of when the capacity is expected to be needed. The results of these capacity auctions directly affect the prices consumers pay for electricity.
The underlying dispute arose from PJM鈥檚 2024/25 capacity auction, which occurred in 2022. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in its calculation of the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement (LDA Reliability Requirement) for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone (DPL South Zone), a subsection of the DPL Pricing Zone covering parts of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. PJM had predicted that certain large power plants and solar facilities would participate in the auction, and because PJM considered both to be relatively unreliable sources of power, it had factored in a need for a correspondingly large amount of backup capacity. When those suppliers declined to participate in the auction at all, the additional backup capacity became unnecessary, but the inflated LDA Reliability Requirement remained.
Seeking to avoid more than $100 million in excess capacity charges, PJM filed requests for relief with FERC under both Section 205 and Section 206 of the FPA,[2] asking FERC to approve a tariff amendment that would authorize PJM to modify the LDA Reliability Requirement before finalizing the results of the auction. In February 2023, FERC approved PJM鈥檚 request under Section 205 and denied its Section 206 filing as moot. PJM then amended its tariff, revised the LDA Reliability Requirement, and completed the auction using the adjusted LDA Reliability Requirement.
The Third Circuit鈥檚 Filed-Rate Doctrine Ruling
Capacity suppliers that would have benefited from the higher clearing price in the original auction results challenged FERC鈥檚 approval of PJM鈥檚 tariff amendment. In PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC, 96 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2024), the Third Circuit vacated FERC鈥檚 orders under the 鈥渇iled-rate doctrine,鈥 which binds regulated entities to charge only the rates that have been filed with FERC and to change their rates only prospectively. As the Third Circuit explained, the doctrine is 鈥渦nbending regardless of where the equities lie鈥 and 鈥渄oes not yield, no matter how compelling the equities.鈥 Importantly, it extends not only to rates per se but also to 鈥渕atters directly affecting rates,鈥 including any 鈥渞ule, regulation, or contract relating thereto.鈥 This stems directly from the text of Section 205, which prohibits changes not just to rates but also to any classification, service, or rule, regulation, or contract relating to such rates without proper prior notice and FERC approval.
The Third Circuit reasoned that PJM鈥檚 tariff amendment violated the filed-rate doctrine because it operated retroactively. Specifically, the court held that it was retroactive to change the LDA Reliability Requirement mid-auction because PJM鈥檚 tariff required that parameter to be calculated and posted before conducting the auction and then used in the auction.
Following the Third Circuit鈥檚 mandate, FERC instructed PJM to completely re-run the auction using the original, inflated LDA Reliability Requirement. When PJM re-ran the auction, it was unable to secure enough capacity for the auction to clear naturally, causing it to clear at a predetermined price cap. Compared to the earlier iteration of the auction, without the inflated LDA Reliability Requirement, PJM spent an additional $182.8 million to procure just under two percent more capacity.
The Section 206 Complaint
A group consisting of state agencies in the Maryland and Delaware governments, PJM customers, and private entities representing customers鈥 interests (together, the 鈥DPL Customers鈥) filed a complaint with FERC under Section 206, asking FERC to declare the re-run auction results unjust and unreasonable and replace them with the efficient market outcome from the original auction. FERC denied the complaint, reasoning that it could not reach an outcome inconsistent with the Third Circuit鈥檚 ruling. In a subsequent order denying rehearing, FERC contended it was powerless to grant relief that would fail the Third Circuit鈥檚 test for retroactivity and lead to an outcome inconsistent with the Third Circuit鈥檚 ruling.
The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 Analysis
The D.C. Circuit granted the petition for review of the relevant FERC orders, applying de novo review because FERC鈥檚 denial rested entirely on its interpretation of the Third Circuit鈥檚 decision, and courts give no deference to an agency鈥檚 interpretation of judicial precedent.
The court emphasized the 鈥渋mportant differences鈥 between Sections 205 and 206, noting that while both require that rates charged by utilities subject to FERC鈥檚 jurisdiction be just and reasonable, they enforce that mandate differently. Section 205 requires regulated entities to file their rates with FERC and primarily involves newly filed rates, whereas Section 206 focuses on existing rates, empowering FERC to modify those it deems unjust or unreasonable. The court characterized FERC鈥檚 role under Section 206 as 鈥渕ore active鈥 than the 鈥渆ssentially passive and reactive鈥 role contemplated by Section 205.
The court determined that the Third Circuit was presented only with and answered in the negative one 鈥渄iscrete legal question: whether FERC acted lawfully when it used its Section 205 authority to modify the process PJM uses to procure capacity.鈥 (Emphasis added.) Critically, the Third Circuit was 鈥渟imply not presented with, nor did it answer, the question of whether a subsequent use of FERC鈥檚 Section 206 authority to modify the resulting auction price would be retroactive, much less impermissible[.]鈥 Indeed, when capacity suppliers had argued that the tariff amendment was impermissibly retroactive because it allowed PJM to disregard the auction results, the Third Circuit declined to take up that argument.
The Upshot: The Filed-Rate Doctrine Does Not Categorically Bar All Retroactive Rate Modifications; Section 206 May Provide an Exception
The D.C. Circuit rejected FERC鈥檚 contention that, under the Third Circuit鈥檚 reasoning, any modification to PJM鈥檚 auction-set capacity price would be retroactive. The court explained that the filed-rate doctrine does not operate independently of the statutory provisions that undergird it. While the filed-rate doctrine generally forbids retroactive modification of rates, this is 鈥渙nly a default rule鈥 and Section 206 provided an exception.
Under Section 206(b), if FERC finds that a rate is not just and reasonable, it may provide refunds for 鈥渁mounts paid鈥 during a Section 206 proceeding, the refund effective date of which is set based on the commencement date of the proceeding. Courts have viewed this refund as a 鈥渞etroactive . . . rate decrease[.]鈥 As such, if the filed-rate doctrine were a complete bar to 鈥渁ll 鈥榬etroactive鈥 rate modifications,鈥 then Section 206(b) would be ineffective. Instead, the court held, reading Section 206(b) as 鈥渁 narrow exception鈥 to the filed-rate doctrine鈥檚 general prohibition of retroactive rate modifications fulfills Congress鈥檚 intent.
The court also rejected FERC鈥檚 argument that granting relief would 鈥渞ender the Third Circuit鈥檚 judgment economically meaningless[.]鈥 The court observed that the Third Circuit is 鈥渁 court, not an economic regulator,鈥 and when a court finds that an agency based its decision upon an improper legal ground, the agency might later reach the same or a similar result for a different reason. Further, FERC did not need to adopt a 鈥渦se-it-or-lose-it approach鈥 when considering different ways it might address the problems caused by PJM鈥檚 forecasting error and the court refused to impose a new requirement without a statutory basis.
Implications
The D.C. Circuit decision provides important guidance in several respects:
First, the case reaffirms the structural distinction between Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. A determination that relief is unavailable under Section 205 does not automatically foreclose relief under Section 206. Parties should evaluate which statutory pathway may be available for addressing concerns.
Second, the case clarifies that the filed-rate doctrine, while foundational to FERC鈥檚 regulatory framework, is not an absolute bar to all backward-looking rate modifications. The refund mechanism under Section 206(b) represents an exception that may provide relief in appropriate circumstances.
The 麻豆传媒 energy regulatory team will continue to track the remand proceedings and welcomes questions on these issues.
[1] By default, the parties have 90 days after entry of judgment (and not the issuance of the mandate) to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. This seems unlikely to happen given that no party sought rehearing.
[2] Section 205 of the FPA requires that all rates and charges for the transmission or sale of electric energy in interstate commerce be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. Section 206, in contrast, allows interested stakeholders or FERC, on its own motion, to initiate proceedings alleging that a rate or term or condition of service is unjust and unreasonable and may violate Section 205. For example, a party can file a complaint with FERC alleging that a rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. If it prevails, FERC must establish a just and reasonable replacement rate supported by substantial evidence. In any proceeding under Section 206, the burden of proof lies with the Commission or the complainant to demonstrate that the rate in question is unjust or unreasonable.